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Bender: Changing the Values in Tort Law

CHANGING THE VALUES IN TORT LAW*
Leslie Bendert

t

I would like to discuss some ways that feminist theory might transform the practice and thinking in tort law, particularly in mass tort law.1
I have two proposals I would like to share. One is about shifting the
burden of proof and persuasion and the initial allocation of economic loss
in cases of mass tort injury. This suggestion arises out of an open recognition of the power dynamics in mass tort litigation. In the second proposal, I suggest that we change the values and the moral vocabulary of tort
* Copyright © 1990 by Leslie Bender. All rights reserved. This Essay is an annotated
version of a talk I gave at the 12th Annual Critical Legal Studies Conference on The New Public
Interest Law, San Francisco, California, on January 7, 1990. It is a synthesis of some of the
arguments I made more fully in an article in 1990 DuKE L. J. (forthcoming). I would like to thank
the Tulsa Law Journal editors for their willingness to deviate from Bluebook style.
t B.A., 1973, Chatham College; J.D., 1979, University of Pittsburgh; LL.M., 1985, Harvard
University. Associate Professor, Syracuse University College of Law.
T At the author's request, citations in the footnotes to this Essay deviate from the style speci-

fied by A UNIFORM

SYSTEM OF CITATION

(14th ed. 1987): citations contain authors' first names and

the names of publishing companies.
Professor Bender explained that her reasons for requesting the addition of authors' first names
are similar to those espoused by Katharine T. Bartlett in a footnote to her article, Feminist Legal
Methods, in the HarvardLaw Review. Professor Bartlett wrote:
I had wanted to humanize and particularize the authors whose ideas I used in this
Article by giving their first as well as last names. Unfortunately, the editors of the Harvard
Law Review, who otherwise have been most cooperative, insisted upon adhering to the
"time-honored" Bluebook convention of using last names only, see A UNIFORM SYSTEM
OF CITATION 91 (14th ed. 1986), except when the writing is a "book," in which case the
first initial is given, id at 83, and except when the writing is by a student, in which case no
name whatsoever is given (unless the student has a name like "Bruce Ackerman," in which
case "it may be indicated parenthetically," id. at 91), see id. In these rules, I see hierarchy,
rigidity, and depersonalization, of the not altogether neutral variety. First names have
been one dignified way in which women could distinguish themselves from their fathers
and their husbands. I apologize to the authors whose identities have been obscured in the
apparently higher goals of Bluebook orthodoxy.
Katharine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829, 829 note (1990).
Professor Bender explained that she also wanted the names of publishing companies included in
order to enable readers to more easily locate the cited books.-Ed.
1. I am using "mass tort" as a catch-all phrase for products liability, mass torts, and toxic
torts that injure large numbers of people (or subject them to the risk of personal injury) and are
caused by the products or activities of large, complex corporate enterprises in the pursuit of commercial self-interest.
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law. I argue that we must reject the language of economics-costs, dollars, and efficiency-as the dominant discourse for tort law's understanding of injuries, remedies, and the requirements of justice. A feminist
ethic of care can be used to redefine the meaning of responsibility and the
kinds of remedies available in tort. These proposals seek significant shifts
in how we think about and talk about tort law. I ask you to listen to
them with an openness that is not usually required in legal thinking. I
know that they are a bit difficult to imagine within the current constraints of our torts models, but I am asking us to go beyond those models and transform tort law in a way that can improve the quality of our
lives and our communities.
I.

POWER BALANCING

One necessary prerequisite to justice is the equalization of power
between disputing or conflicting parties when they present their stories or
claims to a court. If one party can overpower the other in our judicial
system, then problems are solved by brute strength, wealth, or privilege,
rather than by justice, which would instead attend to the particular facts
and circumstances of the dispute. Despite our repeatedly articulated
value of equality-before-the-law, parties in mass tort litigation come to
the courthouse significantly differently empowered, and that power difference affects the possibility of achieving just resolutions. 2 Corporate
defendants are usually highly organized, well-integrated, and wealthy, as
opposed to injured plaintiffs, who are more often poorer and are single
people, families, or a random conglomeration of people who have temporarily combined in a class action lawsuit. 3 Knowledge, social, economic,
2. For the moment, in discussing differential empowerment, I am not discussing the cultural
factors that disempower people in our society. Such factors include race, gender, class, education
level, religious or ethnic background, sexual preference, age, or different physical capabilities. They
are critical aspects of empowerment, and they are deserving of our constant and full attention.
Nonetheless, for purposes of this Essay, I am primarily writing about differences of wealth, knowledge, access, and political power. These differences between mass tort victims and corporate defendants in mass tort cases parallel (and often even accompany) differential empowerment in society
based on cultural identities and factors.
3. In major mass tort litigation, the defendants have included corporations such as JohnsManville Corporation (asbestos), Eli Lilly and Abbott Laboratories (DES), A.H. Robins (Dalkon
Shield), Dow Chemical (Agent Orange), Beatrice Foods and W.R. Grace (Woburn, Mass., groundwater contamination), Richardson-Merrell (Bendectin), Hooker Chemical (Love Canal), Union Carbide (Bhopal), and Exxon (Valdez oil spill), not to mention the major cigarette producing
corporations involved in the tobacco litigation. See also infra note 5. Conversely, evidence has
shown that plaintiffs or injured persons often had fewer resources. AUDREY CHIN & MARK PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS 10-12 (The
Rand Corp., 1985).
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and political power advantages or privileges corporate enterprises in lawsuits by injured individuals. Much of what happens in the mass tort liti-

gation process and courtroom is dependent upon the work, knowledge,
and power of lawyers, technical and scientific experts, and investigators,

all of whom are very expensive. Big corporations often have these lawyers and experts on their payrolls and have the information they need

within their corporate network. Unlike the injured plaintiffs who do not
know they will be injured until after tragedy strikes, corporate defendants have planned for the contingency of conflict and potential litiga-

tion.4 The way the system is now, injured plaintiffs often have to engage
in years of investigation and research just to locate the factual informa-

tion they need from a corporate defendant. They cannot know there is a

"smoking gun" until they find it, and they have to find it before the corporation destroys it.5 This process is very long, expensive, and alienating
4. PETER REUTER, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF EXPANDED CORPORATE LIABILITY:
AN EXPLORATORY STUDY (The Rand Corp., Nov. 1988) (empirical study showing that corporations alter their behaviors in response to potential tort liability); David Rosenberg, The CausalConnection in Mass Exposure Case. A "PublicLaw" Vision ofthe Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REv. 851,
902-05 (1987).
5. The destruction or concealment of important corporate documents by defense counsel and
defendants has characterized some mass tort litigation. Evidence of concealed information and dilatory and/or deceptive discovery practices by corporate defendants occurred in asbestos cases where
toxic exposures leading to asbestosis, mesothelioma, and lung cancers were concealed. RUSSELL
MOKHIBER, CORPORATE CRIME AND VIOLENCE: BIG BUSINESS POWER AND ABUSE OF THE PUB-

LIC TRUST 277, 283-84 (Sierra Club Books, 1988). A medical director of Manville, the nation's
largest asbestos manufacturer, admitted to a policy of refusing to advise workers of asbestosis
because
as long as the man is not disabled, it is felt that he should not be told of his condition so
that he can live and work in peace and the Company can benefit by his many years of
experience. Should the man be told of his condition today, there is a very definite possibility that he would become mentally and physically ill, simply through the knowlege that he
has asbestosis.
Id. at 283-84 (quoting SAMUEL EPSTEIN, M.D., THE POLITICS OF CANCER 93 (Anchor Press/
Doubleday, 1978)). See also Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Johns-Manville Prod. Corp. v. Contra Costa Super. Ct., 27 Cal. 3d
465, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858, 612 P.2d 948 (1980) (asbestos corporations fraudulently withheld information about plaintiffs' illnesses); PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL (Pantheon Books, 1985).
Corporate defendant discovery abuse was also found in the Woburn litigation. See Anderson v.
Beatrice Foods Co., 3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 875 (Dec. 14, 1988) (groundwater contamination case
in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found that there was "overwhelming evidence" of discovery misconduct during the Anderson v. W.R. Grace litigation).
Questionable corporate practices also occurred in the Dalkon Shield cases in which an IUD
with a defectively designed tail-string caused deaths, abortions, infertility, pelvic inflammatory disease, and other injuries to women and their fetuses. See Miles Lord, The Dalkon Shield Litigation:
Revised Annotated Reprimand by ChiefJudge Miles W. Lord, 9 HAMLINE L. REv. 7 (1986); SHELDON ENGELMAYER & ROBERT WAGMAN, LORD'S JUSTICE (Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1985); MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON SHIELD (Pantheon

Books, 1985). For examples of corporate misconduct in other areas, see Matt Tallmer, Chemical

Dumping as a Corporate Way ofLife, in CORPORATE VIOLENCE: INJURY AND
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to plaintiffs who are simultaneously coping with the burdens of their injured bodies and their unequal wealth and power. In addition, plaintiffs
are forced by the system to bear all the initial economic costs-such as

medical expenses and lost income-until they win their lawsuits and appeals.6 How can courts and tort law work to alleviate the disadvantages
of this inequality of power within the judicial process?
Courts have taken one of two approaches to deal with inequalities of
power between parties. One is to ignore it.7 This is the dominant legal

approach. It is noninterventionist-a free market approach of letting the
chips fall where they may, even if that gives one party a license to over-

power the other. A court will blindfold its eyes to the power imbalances.
The other approach is an interventionist approach, based on paternalism,
to protect the vulnerable, less powerful, wounded, or alien.8 Legal pater-

nalism by courts is usually an act of noblesse oblige, an isolated gesture of
mercy, a gift from the empowered. A court substitutes its power for that
of the weaker party and momentarily overpowers the mightier one.

A feminist analysis leads to a third approach for dealing with inequality of power between parties before the court. This approach entails
empowering others, or what I call power-balancing. Professor Robin

West, in her influential article, Jurisprudence and Gender, distinguishes
between dominant male and alternative female experiences of power and
I l (S. Hills, ed., Rowman & Littlefield, 1987) (Hooker Chemical Co. cases involving Love Canal,
Bloody Run Creek, Bethpage, and Hicksville, N.Y., Taft, La., and Occidental Chemical
Co. at Lathrop, Cal.); Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 69 (1989) ("state of the art" chemical plant with environmental controls managed
by uneducated janitor who "squeegied" toxic chemicals into the sewer system and clear management
cost-based rejections of necessary environmental improvements that caused physical injuries and
chemically-induced immune deficiencies in neighbors).
6. Of course, some of plaintiffs' expenses may be paid by first-party insurance, health care
insurance provided through their workplaces, workers' compensation, and/or government benefit
programs.
7. Power differences are ignored in the sense that they are not spoken of, but not in the sense
that the differences do not make a difference. To truly ignore these power differences and their
effects, courts would have to alter the process dynamics to eliminate power advantages or
disadvantages.
8. Duncan Kennedy, Distributiveand PaternalistMotives in Contractand Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982)
(arguing that decisionmakers use paternalist motives under the rhetoric of unequal bargaining
power, although they disguise them as distributive or efficient); Frances Olsen, From False Paternalism to False Equality: Judicial Assaults on Feminist Community, Illinois 1869-1895, 84 MICH. L.
REV. 1518 (1986). For slightly different uses of the idea of paternalism in law and philosophy, see
Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in PHILOSOPHY, POLrrICS AND SOCIETY, 78 (Yale Univ. Press, 5th
ser., 1979), reprinted in abridgedform from 56 The Monist 1 (Jan. 1972) ("By paternalism I shall
understand roughly the interference with a person's liberty of action justified by reasons referring
exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values of the person being coerced.");
David Luban, Paternalismand the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 454.
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notes how those different understandings of power affect its uses and responsibilities.9 While debates rage about whether these differences are
biologically tethered, socially constructed as part of gender, or politically
constructed through subordination and oppression, the resolution of
those debates does not affect the depth of West's insight about different
kinds and uses of power. West suggests that women's experiences of having power often arise in situations of grave inequality, as in parenting,
where a woman usually uses her power to protect and guide, rather than
overbear or control. She explains that parental (in particular maternal)
power, derived from the physical power and knowledge differential between parent and child, is interpreted by the power-holder as a responsibility to care for and empower the less powerful child.'" Sara Ruddick
makes a similar observation about maternal power and practice in her
writings." It is the very awareness of the inequality of power that
prompts or produces the responsibility to protect, to enable, and to give
care.
These two modalities of power can be differentiated as "overpowering or controlling/protecting" (a masculinist model) and "empowering
or power-balancing" (a feminist model). In general, our legal system
claims to remain neutral or blind to the power of the parties before it, but
occasionally in the face of evidence of unconscionable abuses of unequal
power, a court will exercise its paternalistic power to "overpower" the
bully, "control" the parties, and "protect" the vulnerable in the masculinist model sense. This paternalistic intervention is not bad or wrong for
a court to do, but it is not the same as empowering a disadvantaged
party. The general power imbalance of the parties as litigants in the
court is neither addressed nor altered by a court's paternalistic intervention. The court and the rules of law do not respond to a disadvantaged
party's need for empowerment, nor do they balance power in the courthouse so that she or he can have equal access to, or opportunities for,
9. Robin West, Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1988). She elaborates further on this analysis in Robin West, Feminism, CriticalSocial Theory andLaw, 1989 U. Cm. LEGAL
F. 59, 80-81.
10. Let me not be misunderstood. Although I believe that our understandings and experiences
of this kind of exercise of power arise out of women's experiences in caregiving to persons less
enabled than they are (eg., children, elderly, sick, or injured), I am not representing that this concept of power is unique to women or that all women understand power in this manner.
11. SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF PEACE (Beacon Press,
1989) (Maternal practice, in societies where children demand protection, nurturance, and training,
involves the exercise of power to achieve the goals of preservation, growth, and social acceptability
for one's children.).
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justice. Legal paternalism does not challenge the distribution of power
or how it impacts on the judicial process itself.
To empower a mass tort plaintiff, a court must alleviate some of the

initial impediments to equal justice. This can be done by shifting some
burdens from the less powerful, injured plaintiff to the disproportionately
empowered corporate defendant. Because injured victims of mass harm
do not usually have lawyers, ready access to necessary evidence or infor-

mation to support their claims,1 2 or adequate resources to spend, it
makes sense to shift the burden of initiating a lawsuit and burdens of
proof and persuasion to the more-empowered party who putatively
caused the harm or created the risk and who can better bear this burden.
Tort law doctrine and common law judges can alter burden-shifting
rules by placing the risks of nonproduction and nonpersuasion13 on the
more-empowered party to the litigation, which in mass tort would probably be a corporate defendant. Once plaintiff has filed an injury claim
accompanied by a simple probable-cause-like showing that a corporate
defendant created a risk of harm to which the plaintiff was exposed, the

law can immediately require the corporate defendant to pay all of plaintiff's economic losses (medical expenses, wage loss, specials).' 4 Tort doc-

trine could raise a rebuttable presumption that a corporate defendant was
liable for all such expenses. 5 If defendant believes it is unjust that it
should be required to pay economic losses, then defendant has the burden of initiating legal action to persuade a court that it is not responsible
12. For example, the evidence discovery task would be easier for a corporate producer or actor
putatively responsible for the harm because of its easier access to the information and its greater
resources. A defendant's greater access to necessary information has been recognized by courts as
grounds for shifting burdens. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 573
P.2d 443 (1978).
13. For purposes of this Essay, I use "burden of proof" to mean the obligation to produce
evidence and convince or persuade a court or jury about the correctness of your position in order to
prevail. Wigmore referred to this as the "risk of nonpersuasion" and "the risk of nonproduction." 9
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2485, 2487-2488 (1981), cited in FLEMING JAMES, JR., & GEOFFREY
HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 7.6 n.1, 7.7 n.2 (3d ed. Little, Brown & Co., 1985).
14. It is imaginable that with a change to a corporate defendant's burden of proof and a plaintiff's presumption of nonliability in mass tort cases, a court might require a defendant immediately
to escrow funds for the plaintiff's benefit and may entitle plaintiff access to some of those funds for
health, maintenance, and even litigation expenses as needed. Alternatively, the law could require
that defendant's employee compensation and health plan cover the victims after an initial probable
cause showing has been made. Failure to act immediately, as required by law, could subject the
recalcitrant or dilatory defendant to sanctions.
15. An Indian lower court made a similar move in response to the Bhopal tragedy when it
ordered that Union Carbide pay $192 million into a fund for the victims prior to any trial or finding
of liability. Stephen Adler, BhopalRuling Tests Novel Legal Theory, WALL ST. J., May 15, 1988, at
33, col. 3.
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for plaintiff's harms.

6

If defendant prevails, defendant would be entitled

to repayment of the moneys it fronted. Likewise, if plaintiff believed she
was entitled to more than economic losses, she could counterclaim or
initiate an action for noneconomic damages.
The tort system works in the opposite fashion today. Plaintiffs must
bear the economic loss and expenses of their own injuries, even if they
were faultless and defendants clearly caused their harm. But if they file a
lawsuit and win, the defendant must repay them. In our current con-

struction of tort law, defendants come to court with a rebuttable presumption of nonliability. I am arguing that the presumption could just
as readily attach to the less-empowered plaintiffs. The law already uses a
presumption of nonliability. The issue here is where it should best be

placed to foster justice and fairness.
Burden-shifting presumptions like the one I propose here are not
17
uncommon in law. They are used, for example, with res ipsa loquitur,

market share and enterprise liability," or alternative joint liability.19
However, the presumptions usually shift the burden of just one element
of the cause of action-causation or negligence. This proposal, designed
to balance the power of the parties, would shift the initial presumption of
16. This power-balancing approach would work just as well in a case where the plaintiff is a
large corporate organization and the defendant is a less-empowered individual. The burden of proof
and production would always be placed on the more-empowered party and the presumption of nonliability would always be on the less-empowered party, regardless of which one is the plaintiff or
defendant.
17. See Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944); Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. Ch. 1863). Res
ipsa loquitureither raises an inference of negligence that permits a plaintiff to get to a jury or raises a
presumption of negligence that shifts the burden to a defendant to rebut, depending upon the particular jurisdiction. DAN DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 173 (West Pub. Co., 1985); PROSSER & KEETON, TORTS
§§ 39-40 (5th ed. West Pub. Co., 1984).
18. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 607 P.2d 924, cert
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y.
1972); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984);
Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984). These relatively new enterprise or alternative liability theories were developed in the context of DES litigation. In circumstances where negligence or strict liability has been proven but proof of identity of a specific
defendant has been made impossible through no fault of the plaintiff, the burden of proof is shifted to
the multiple defendants to prove the identity of the single defendant who caused the harm.
19. See Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). Alternative joint liability will shift
the burden of causation to defendants when all possible defendants are before the court and have
been proven to have been negligent towards the plaintiff; but identification of which one of the
several defendants caused the harm is impossible. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 433B (1965).
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nonliability for economic losses from the corporate defendant to the injured plaintiff and simultaneously shift the entire burden of proving liability and producing persuasive evidence from the injured plaintiff to the
corporate defendant.
In addition to power-balancing, this proposal will have two other
beneficial side effects. First, if defendants are required to pay first and
sue to recoup their losses, they will no longer be motivated to use their
resources to delay and obfuscate resolution of cases. Secondly, if the law
holds corporate defendants liable for the initial economic losses due to
injuries, defendant corporations might use their greater political clout to
lobby for kinds of socialized medical care and income maintenance for
injured plaintiffs. Defendants have no incentives to lobby actively for
these statutory, tax-funded compensation schemes when they have no responsibility for the initial economic losses. Upon a change in the burden
of proof and persuasion and the presumption of nonliability, it is likely
that defendant corporations would immediately seek political relief in the
form of compensation plans, or, if nothing else, they would insure
accordingly.
By power-balancing or empowering a party, the court is not interfering in the merits or substance of the controversy. This feminist approach
does not "decide" the case, but gives the parties more equal opportunities
to present their claims. If we continue with only the masculinist approach to power taken by courts, wherein they intervene "ad hoc" paternalistically in deciding particular cases based on a vulnerability of one
party or an abuse of power by another, we ignore the role that unequal
power and resources currently play in the legal conflict-resolution process itself. We also contravene our ideal of equal-justice-before-the-law
which includes the belief that-justice is not "for sale" to the highest bidder. If the burden remains with unempowered injured plaintiffs, plaintiffs' capacities to underwrite (or plaintiffs' abilities to locate experienced,
wealthy lawyers to underwrite) these costs will determine plaintiffs' access to discovery, experts, trial, settlement, and ultimately justice. Even
with this alteration in the burden of proof and the presumption of nonliability for the plaintiff, defendant corporations in mass tort cases would be
as capable of prevailing in the litigation on the merits as they are today,
but they will not be as advantaged in the process by their greater resources, power, or knowledge.
Because my time is limited, I must move on to my second proposal,
but I hope you have at least an idea about these possibilities.
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II.

LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY

As "TAKING CARE OF"

I realize that I am asking a lot of openness of you as a listener,
because my next proposal imagines a major change in how we think
about what law is and can do in the area of tort, about how law understands human relationships, and about how it reflects and implements
our values. I am asking you to rethink seriously how law remedies personal injuries. I am seeking a paradigm shift in how lawyers understand
responsibility in tort law. There is a conservative human tendency to
dismiss major changes as unworkable and to prefer the status quo. I
hope you will fight that impulse and listen openly. This will require you
to start thinking from different premises and assumptions than currently
underlie tort law when it considers just resolutions of personal injury
problems.
Tort law has been weighted down by a language and value system
that privileges economics and costs. Every time there is an injury, we
determine legal responsibility by asking about the dollar and efficiency
costs of paying for the harms and/or of avoiding them. Questions of cost
that have consistently been our first or second inquiry ought to come
much later in the analysis. So as you listen to this, if you are prompted
to ask "how much will this cost?", or "wouldn't it be more efficient or
cost-effective to ... ?", or "how can we pay for this?", please suspend
these questions about the economics of accidents for the time being.
As harms from mass tort have become more widespread, legal analysis in tort law has become desensitized to the individuals and groups of
people harmed. The more people who are injured or subjected to the risk
of injury, the more tort law dehumanizes people generally, sees them as
statistics, or sees their injuries as costs of economic growth and progress.
If this kind of legal thinking is inconsistent with our core values, we
ought to reject it outright as violative of human dignity and equality and
reorient legal values to appreciate every individual's special humanity.
Strangers are no less human because we do not know them. Legal doctrines must be reconstructed to treat each person with the same care and
concern that we would want given to our friends and family, to the people we do know.
Feminist theory and method, particularly insights from the work of
Carol Gilligan, can help us alter the values and moral vocabulary of tort
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law. 20 My suggestion is that we use feminist theory to change the meaning of responsibility in tort-which now means primarily an obligation to
make monetary reparations for harms caused-to a meaning rooted in a

concept of care. This enriched meaning of responsibility arises out of our
recognition of our interconnectedness as human beings and has to do
with responding through interpersonal caregiving to the needs of someone who has been injured. It means taking care of. Responsibility as

taking care of, rather than solely as paying for, seems completely absent
from the law, although it is part of our social understanding of the meaning of responsibility that arises out of our experiences as parents, siblings,

lovers, friends, and neighbors. 2 1 It is time for legal responsibility to include this meaning.
20. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DE-

VELOPMENT (Harvard Univ. Press, 1982) [hereinafter GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE]; Carol
Gilligan, Remapping the Moral Domain: New Images of Self in Relationship, in MAPPING THE
MORAL DOMAIN: A CONTRIBUTION OF WOMEN'S THINKING TO PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND

EDUCATION 3 (C. Gilligan, J. Ward, . Taylor, and B. Bardige, eds,, Harvard Univ. Press, 1988).
21. Carol Gilligan and her associates have denominated this approach an ethic of care. Professor Gilligan noted that standard evaluations of moral development based on open-ended answers to
hypothetical moral problems failed to listen carefully to the multiple perspectives being expressed by
subjects. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE, supra note 20. In particular, she focused her criticism
on Lawrence Kohlberg's multi-stage model. Kohlberg's popularly used and respected psychological
measuring tools valued answers from the perspective Gilligan called an ethic of rights or ethic of
justice. These tests concluded that moral reasoning was more advanced if it was based on (1) abstract principles (like equality, justice, fairness), (2) objective and universal rules, (3) fair formal
procedures, and (4) the balancing of hierarchical rights (property, contract, duty). See GILLIGAN,
IN A DIFFERENT VOICE, supra note 20. Gilligan contrasted the ethic of rights/justice with another
ethic that had been excluded, submerged, or undervalued by contemporary psychological measures.
This different approach or different voice was founded on an ethic of responsibility and care. Gilligan claimed that these different "voices" (of rights/justice and responsiblity/care) depended greatly
on different perceptions of human relationships and manners of seeing others. See GILLIGAN, IN A
DIFFERENT VOICE, supra note 20.
Nona Lyons pursued Gilligan's research and found two distinct perspectives of self, relationships, and morality-the separate/objective self and the connected self. Nona Lyons, Two Perspectives" On Self Relationships, and Morality, in MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN, supra note 20, at 21.
The separate/objective self ("autonomous in relation to others") has a perspective of relationships
based on reciprocity (considering others as one would like to be considered, with objectivity and
fairness, and assuming that others are the same as self) mediated through rules (primarily of equality) and grounded in roles (that are derived from obligations and duties). Lyons, supra, at 33. The
connected self ("interdependent in relation to others") experiences its relationships through responses to others in theirterms ("alleviation of their burdens, hurt, or suffering") mediated through
the activity of care (focused on maintaining connection and caring in relationships) and grounded in
interdependence and interconnectedness. Lyons, supra, at 33-35. The response and care perspective
requires seeing others in their own terms, contextually, and assumes that others are different from
oneself. Lyons, supra, at 34.
Carol Gilligan and Jane Attanucci distinguished between these foci as follows:
A justice perspective draws attention to problems of inequality and oppression and holds
up an ideal of reciprocity and equal respect. A care perspective draws attention to
problems of detachment or abandonment and holds up an ideal of attention and response
to need. Two more injuctions--not to treat others unfairly and not to turn away from
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A responsibility to give care (or care for) has always existed in the
lived experiences of tort victims and their friends and families. Injured
people need direct, personal services of caregiving to survive and recover.
Interpersonal caregiving always involves planning, organizing, managing, being available as needed, and keeping another's needs in the forefront of one's mind. Personal caregiving consists of both physical and
emotional work in response to the needs of the person being cared for. 2
It runs the gamut from providing services such as shopping, transporta-

tion, and arranging for medical treatments, to retraining or educating, to
feeding and aiding in personal hygiene care, to rebuilding self-confidence,

and even to spending time with the injured person and treating her with
dignity and importance.2 3 It requires personal time, energy, and atten-

tion from the caregiver in a manner completely ignored by the tort
system.
someone in need--capture these different concerns ....
Since everyone has been vulnerable both to oppression and to abandonment, two moral visions-one of justice and one of
care-recur in human experience.
Carol Gilligan & Jane Attanucci, Two MoralOrientations, in MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN, supra
note 20, at 73-74. Both Gilligan and Lyons hinted that these different perspectives were associated
with gender-that is, women more dominantly expressed the care/response focus and men expressed
themselves more often in terms of justice or equality/rights. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE,
supra note 20; Lyons, supra. Gilligan and Attanucci did a later study to explore gender associations
with these moral orientations. Gilligan & Attanucci, supra, at 73. Their preliminary results indicated that both men and women express concerns about justice and care, "but [that] people tend to
focus on one set of concerns and minimally represent the other." Gilligan & Attanucci, supra,at 82.
The problem with the simultaneous co-existence of each perspective is that they seem to contradict
one another.
The tension between these perspectives is suggested by the fact that detachment, which is
the mark of mature moral judgment in the justice perspective, becomes the moral problem
in the care perspective-the failure to attend to need. Conversely, attention to the particular needs and circumstances of individuals, the mark of mature moral judgment in the care
perspective, becomes the moral problem in the justice perspective-failure to treat others
fairly, as equals.
Carol Gilligan & Jane Attanucci, supra, at 82 (emphasis in original). Both perspectives are important to resolving torts disputes, but the different voice that is more common in women is practically
nonexistent in tort law.
22. See ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART: COMMERCIALIZATION OF HUMAN
FEELING (Univ. of Cal. Press, 1983).
23. It is inevitable at this point in my argument that someone finds a particularly exaggerated
and distorted example of caregiving so that he can reject this model outright. For example, a professor at Duke Law School rejected this idea based on a hypothetical he devised. The professor assumed that this theory would require him to be bathed and fed by a large, hostile, and burly Hell's
Angel biker from the late 1960s after that person had scratched the professor's classic, cherry red
motorcycle when no one was on or near it. Panel discussion on Tort Remedies, Frontiers of Legal
Thought Conference, Duke Law School, January 25, 1990.
when I presented this idea at the Association of American Law Schools annual meeting Torts
Section panel, January 5, 1990, some audience members dismissed the model with sarcastic chortles
about Lee Iacocca chauffeuring victims of Pinto accidents or corporate executives "wasting" their
time bathing and feeding victims. Others were prompted immediately to ask about the economic
efficiency and costs of the plans. I understand that our legal training leads us to these "reflex"
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The burden of caregiving has traditionally fallen on the friends and
family of the injured and on people hired to do these tasks-usually
lower class women who are paid too little and are given no prestige for

their vital work. Tort law has never deemed interpersonal caregiving to
be the responsibility of the tortfeasor, except perhaps to pay for a small

portion of it. If interpersonal caregiving is a necessary and essential part
of the social and moral responsibility involved in taking care of any in-

jured person, why doesn't legal responsibility include it? Someone must
always do this work when there is injury. If the law doesn't hold a tort
defendant liable or responsible for this caregiving, who ends up being

"held responsible" by default? The law's ignoring these responsibilities
does not make them go away. And if all the law does is ask a harm-

causing defendant to pay the costs of others' caregiving, it is passing on
or transferring the interpersonal caregiving responsibility to a third party
24
instead of requiring a defendant to assume it.

It is arguable that the law's meaning of responsibility does not include interpersonal caregiving because that kind of work has tradition-

ally been done by women, not by the men who created and developed
responses and argumentative techniques. I would like humbly to suggest that many of these responses miss the point I am trying to make. Perhaps it is too difficult for well-trained legal scholars
to listen with the openness I asked for. Law is a very conservative discipline.
It would be valuable at least to reiterate here that the caregiving responsibilities that I argue the
law ought to impose would be particularized to the needs and desires of the injured party and would
be responsive to the personal injuries suffered from defendants' conduct or decisionmaking. For
example, in the Duke professor's hypothetical which I described above, he suffered no personal
injuries in the accident, so he would not need the defendant to "bathe or feed" him. Secondly, if the
theory was to apply in a circumstance without personal injuries, it might be the responsibility of a
harm-causer to arrange for alternative transportation and the repair of the damaged property, in
addition to paying for those damages.
24. If defendants can buy insurance or pay their debt and terminate their liability, they will not
fully own up to their interpersonal responsibility. Victims cannot buy insurance that will prevent
them from having to live with their suffering and cope with their disabilities. Insurance might provide money for out-of-pocket expenses (and even for intangible harms), but it does not begin to
address the other human aspects of injury.
One argument for change would be to place a dollar value on this caregiving work, enumerate
all the possible ways in which it might be needed, and then make defendant corporations responsible
by requiring them to internalize these costs as well. Caregiving costs are a necessary part of our
economy that has been silently and "freely" borne by families (and primarily women). Now that we
realize this and have learned about the labor value of these caregiving responsibilities on the market,
we are able to calculate their approximate economic value for inclusion in a corporate defendant's
damages liability. Tort law could be amended so that financial responsibility for harm includes the
market value of caregiving costs. While this is an optional argument, it compounds the problem of
translating everything into dollar values which, I have argued elsewhere, led to the "liability crisis"
in the first place. It also permits defendants to transfer their "responsibility" by purchasing more
insurance. The price of insurance can be calculated into the price of the product or the cost of the
activity. This spreads the loss in an efficient fashion, but fails to encourage corporate officers, employees, and shareholders to take individual or personal responsibility for the consequences of their
decisions or actions.
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tort law, nor by the men who ran the business world that created all
these mass torts and personal injuries. Those men may have inadvertently universalized the meaning of responsibility from their own experiences without recognizing its partiality and underinclusiveness. To
them, being responsible for family usually meant providing financial support. Therefore, it is not surprising that when they wrote the law, "paying for" or "financial responsibility" became the definition of
responsibility. But now, in the 1990s, we can see how flawed and incomplete that reasoning is.
Women have always known that responsibility means taking care of
and that taking care of involves interpersonal caregiving, time, and energy. If women had designed tort remedies, we probably would have
done it very differently. By using only part of human experience to construct law, we get laws that only partially respond to human needs.
There is nothing natural or necessary about the way law is ordered now.
We can construct tort law to recognize the human and social character of
injured people rather than just their commodity or exchange value. We
can change the meaning of responsibility in tort law to blend obligations
to pay and obligations to give care. Neither one alone would be adequate-at least not until we get a system of guaranteed health care and
income maintenance. If that came to pass, then we could cut back the
meaning of responsibility to include only obligations of caregiving.
How can the law hold corporate defendants, corporate officers, and
corporate decisionmakers personally responsible in an interpersonal
caregiving way for the mass harms they cause in their relentless pursuit
of materialism and convenience? This is where we all need to brainstorm. We need to develop new kinds of remedies where corporate officers have nondelegable duties to provide direct interpersonal servicestime and energy-for the care of their victims or of persons similarly
situated.2 5 Each situation would be different. The specific kinds of care
25. It is certainly possible that a particular victim would not want to see or be with the person
who caused the harm she suffers. In that case, defendants may be required to take interpersonal
caregiving responsibility for a different, but similarly situated person, and other defendants might
take some interpersonal caregiving responsibility for the first victim.
Defendants who are inexperienced in caregiving may need to be trained to do physical caretaking (from changing bedding or dressings, to feeding, exercising, providing transportation, or
whatever is needed), to provide emotional care and support, and to focus on another's needs and
respond to them.
How can you teach someone to give care? This may be a difficult task, but we do it every day in
training children and in training students or apprentices in caregiving professions. The more complicated question is: Would care by someone forced by law to give it be worse than no care at all?
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needed would depend on the particularized needs of the victim.26 If

tortfeasors have to take direct personal caregiving responsibilities for the
harms they cause, then families and friends of victims will be relieved of
a portion of the increased responsibility the injuries have imposed upon

them. The responsibilities will not be lifted completely from loved ones,
but the help with them will be appreciated.

A salutory effect of this change might be that corporate officers
would be goaded into reprioritizing health, welfare, and human dignity
in their decisionmaking because they would know they would have to
give personal caregiving services to persons injured by their actions or
decisions. Because they would not want to spend their time, effort, and

emotional energy on strangers they happened to injure while doing their
jobs, they would take much greater care to avoid that potentiality.
It is hard to imagine how this could work, because we have been so
inculcated in the language of dollars and costs-paying for injuries, not
giving care. But I ask you to be open. A legal definition of responsibility
in tort that includes notions of interpersonal caregiving, of taking care of,
makes sense if we can agree on certain assumptions or premises. If we
can agree that part of being human is being connected, interrelated, and
mutually dependent; if we can agree that personal injuries always give

rise to needs for interpersonal caregiving, in addition to needs for money;
if we can agree that a language of torts that singularly translates injuries
and responsibility into dollars is partial, inadequate, and disrespectful of
the fullness of our human dignity; and if we can agree that we prefer
values in tort law that go beyond economics and a language of dollars to
Would it feel demeaning and awful to the recipient? It is hard enough to accept ideas like Rousseau's about forcing people to be free; what about forcing people to give care? We need to think
seriously about what this really means, how it could be accomplished, and the effects it would have
on the victims or recipients of this kind of care.
Maybe it is not giving care that we ought to require of tortfeasors, but performing some of the
traditional caregiving functions to alleviate the burden on family and friends. The point I want to
emphasize here is that, as difficult as it might be to conceptualize requiring care or caregiving behavior from mass tortfeasors, by not requiring this kind of interpersonal responsibility from defendants,
we are requiring it from family members or loving friends. It has to be done. It does not go away
because we do not require defendants to do it. It is just silenced and unvalued.
26. For example, in the Dalkon Shield cases, corporate defendants might be ordered by law to
fulfill their caregiving responsibilities by finding openings in infertility clinics for victims, arranging
their appointments and transportation for the necessary visits, organizing necessary clinics if what
already exists is inadequate, locating competent marriage and psychological counseling, developing
private adoption alternatives for those women who want children but cannot conceive, and the like.
For cases like the Exxon oil spill, corporate officers and executives might be required to do the
physical labor of cleaning oil from the birds and shorelines. In the Pinto cases, it might be perfectly
appropriate to have Lee Iacocca and his top corporate officers transport burn victims to medical
facilities, arrange for appropriate living spaces and available nursing care, and work in burn centers
giving their support (emotional, physical, companionship) to victims or those similarly situated.
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include an ethic of care, I know that together we can develop concrete
and practical remedies.2 7 I invite your suggestions and critiques. I
would like these ideas to begin a new conversation-a dialogue about the
possibilities of reconstructing the underlying values of tort law and of
eliminating our often callous indifference to risk-imposition.
27. I imagine that the people who first suggested community service obligations as criminal
penalties were pooh-poohed as impractical. Yet community service is now an accepted part of our
criminal jurisprudence.
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